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US Mediation in Greek-Turkish 
Disputes since 1954
Theodora Kalaitzaki
Greece and Turkey emerged from the Second World War as solid members 
of the Western alliance, their bilateral territorial disputes appearing settled. 
The confl icts dating back to Ottoman times seemed memories, fading into a 
new tradition of peace and friendship established in the early 1930s in the 
historic reconciliation of the powerful and charismatic leaders, Eleftherios 
Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War both had sided with the West-
ern countries, and with their participation in the Western European institu-
tions (the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
they became “offi cially” part of the Western bloc led by the United States 
against the Eastern bloc of communist states. 
In the diffi cult Cold War environment the three allies seemed to have har-
monious relations focusing on the external communist danger coming from 
the north. This cordial era ended in 1954 with the eruption of the Cyprus 
problem, a bilateral confl ict between Greece and Turkey that persisted into 
the next decades with the emergence of the Aegean dispute. After the emer-
gence of the Cyprus dispute, both states expected the involvement of the 
United States, aiding one against the other. The United States to a certain 
extent unwillingly became the “mediator” between the two states, and this 
task continues until today.
In this essay I summarize the historical background of Greek-Turkish 
relations during the interwar years, the political and security challenges the 
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two states faced at the end of the Second World War, and the beginning of 
the alliance ties among the United States, Greece, and Turkey. I also exam-
ine the most serious Cyprus and Aegean crises along with American media-
tion and solution efforts. The last part is devoted to US involvement in the 
post–Cold War era.
Greek-Turkish Relations at the End of the Second World War
The settlement reached at Lausanne on 24 July 1923, after the Greek-
Turkish war of 1919 to 1922, solved territorial and minority issues and 
laid the foundations for peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey.1 
Exhausted by many years of wars, both countries faced enormous problems 
of domestic reconstruction. The two states were prepared to develop good 
and stable relations and both pursued these goals during the interwar years.
An additional factor in the development of détente between Greece and 
Turkey, which gained ground in the late 1920s, was a growing perception of 
common defense interests. While Greece and Turkey still mistrusted each 
other to some extent, both of them had serious concerns about Bulgaria’s 
ambitions to gain access to the Aegean as well as about Italy’s intentions in 
the eastern Mediterranean.2
In June 1930, Greece and Turkey signed an agreement that settled all the 
remaining disputes arising out of the exchange of populations and the value 
of properties left behind. Although the terms of the agreement were criticized 
1. At Lausanne, Turkey’s boundary with Greece was set at the Evros (Maritsa) River, which sepa-
rates western and eastern Thrace. Greece retained its sovereignty over the Aegean islands with two 
exceptions: Gokceada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), which guard the entrance to the straits, 
were restored to Turkey (Lausanne Treaty: Part 1: article 3). The islands of the eastern Aegean, 
because of Turkish security concerns, were to be demilitarized (Lausanne Treaty: Part 1: article 
13). In addition, the Lausanne Treaty arranged the fate of the Greek and Turkish minorities. The 
protocol signed on 30 January 1923 at Lausanne provided for the compulsory exchange of the 
Greeks of Asia Minor and the Turks of Greece, with two exceptions—the Greeks of Istanbul and the 
Muslim Turks and Pomaks of western Thrace in Greece (articles 1–2). The treaty safeguarded the 
cultural and educational rights of the minorities (articles 40–43). See Lausanne Treaty (in Greek) 
(Athens: Papazisis), 45–50, 71–86; Sina Sukru Gürel, Turkish-Greek Relations in a Historical Con-
text (in Turkish) (Ankara: Ümıt, 1993), 30–4; Mehmet Gönlülbol et al., Events of Turkish Foreign 
Policy (Ankara: Cem Ofset, 1996), 48–59; Kemal Ari, The Great Exchange: The Forced Migration 
to Turkey (in Turkish) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi  Yurt, 1995).
2. Konstantinos Svolopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, 1900–1945 (in Greek) (Athens: Estia, 1994), 
211–32.
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in Greece as too favorable to Turkey, Venizelos attached a high priority to a 
policy of conciliation with the Turks. The mutual understanding between the 
two countries was further enhanced with the Treaty of Neutrality, Concilia-
tion, and Arbitration as well as with a protocol providing for parity of naval 
armaments, signed between Venizelos and Izmet Inönü in October 1930.3 
In September 1933, the two countries signed a friendship pact guarantee-
ing the inviolability of their borders and committing them to consult each 
other on matters of common interest. During the following year, the two coun-
tries took another step in collaboration when they joined the Balkan Entente 
with Yugoslavia and Romania. By joining the Balkan Entente, Greece and 
Turkey hoped to discourage anticipated pressures from Italy or Germany.4 
However, neither this nor subsequent bilateral Greek-Turkish agreements 
deterred Italy and Germany from pursuing their ambitions to penetrate and 
control the Balkans. In any case, Greece and Turkey were unprepared to 
undertake obligations that might draw them into war with a Great Power. 
Thus, when German troops occupied Greece, following the unsuccessful Ital-
ian invasion in October 1940, Turkey remained neutral.5
The Beginning of the Triangular Relationship 
after the End of the Second World War
After the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers in 1945, the need to 
fi ll the resulting power vacuum led to the appearance of diverging national 
3. Areti Tounta-Fergadi, Issues in Greek Diplomatic History (in Greek) (Athens: Paratiritis, 1986), 
243–9; Gürel, 35–52.
4. Konstantinos Svolopoulos, The Balkan Pact and Greek Foreign Policy, 1928–1934 (in Greek) 
(Athens: Estia, 1974).
5. Turkey’s decision to stay neutral during the Second World War disappointed Greece. Greek lead-
ers felt that Turkey was under an obligation to come to Greece’s aid under the terms of the Balkan 
Entente and subsequent Turkish assurances to help Greece. But Turkey continued to recognize the 
Greek government in exile and offered Greece help in terms of food and other relief items. One other 
issue that strained Greek-Turkish relations during the Second World War was Turkey’s imposition of 
an emergency capital levy called varlik vergisi on non-Muslim communities in Turkey, including the 
Greeks, in November 1942. The Turkish government justifi ed the tax on the grounds that it needed 
to raise revenue to fi nance Turkey’s growing military expenditures. However, Greeks and other 
minorities complained that they were assessed higher levies than Turks, and the Greek government 
lodged protests to Ankara. The Turkish government removed the tax a year after its imposition. See 
Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974 (Ath-
ens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 211–33.
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interests inside the wartime alliance. The intentions of the Allies became 
diametrically opposed after the end of the Second World War. The USSR, for 
instance, which emerged as an important power, wished to expand its infl u-
ence and establish “friendly” regimes in all of the states close to its borders. 
In contrast, the United States, under President Harry Truman’s leadership, 
initially followed Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of maintaining the alliance and 
acting together within a system of collective security. But the United States 
soon realized that the wartime harmony had vanished.
In southeastern Europe Greece found itself in the middle of a chaotic eco-
nomic and political situation upon liberation in October 1944. The commu-
nist and anticommunist Greek resistance groups had been waging a confl ict, 
aiming at the political control of the country.6 In comparison, Turkey, which 
had managed to remain out of the war, emerged with its economy intact and 
without crises in its domestic political institutions. The Soviet Union, in its 
effort to expand its infl uence in southeastern Europe, indirectly provided 
support to the Greek communists in the civil war, demanded of Turkey naval 
bases in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and made claims over Kars and 
Ardahan.
These attempts were perceived as revisionist objectives in the Greek-Turk-
ish area. Therefore, the governments of Greece and Turkey sought to secure 
commitments, peacetime entanglements, active presence, and guarantees 
from the West, and especially from the United States, to contain Soviet pen-
etration. Various Greek cabinets did so with the utmost urgency and with no 
other options while successive Turkish governments sought US aid after a 
careful weighing of all options available.
The US commitment toward Greece and Turkey was undertaken in the 
context of Washington’s Cold War political strategy. The United States had 
become convinced of Josef Stalin’s intentions to “export communism,” and 
6. Throughout the occupation years a signifi cant resistance movement developed and carried out 
acts of sabotage and harassment against the Germans. The most important groups were EAM 
(National Liberation Front) and its military arm, ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army), and 
EDES (National Republican Greek League). EAM and ELAS were dominated at the leadership 
level by members of the Communist Party. However, other parties and agrarian and socialist groups 
participated in EAM, and the overwhelmingly majority of the rank and fi le were not communists. 
EDES was republican and anticommunist in orientation. Giannis Gianopoulos, The Post-War World: 
Greek and European History, 1945–1963 (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisis, 1992), 191–221.
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Britain had notifi ed the United States of its inability to continue assistance to 
Greece and Turkey.
On 12 March 1947, President Truman announced what later became 
known as the Truman Doctrine, declaring that the United States was to sup-
port free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minori-
ties (Greece) or by outside pressures (Turkey).7 If Greece fell under the 
control of an armed minority, the effect on Turkey would be immediate and 
serious, and the ensuing confusion and disorder might well spread through-
out the Middle East. Truman asked for an allocation of $400 million of aid 
to be spent on supporting the shattered economy of Greece and providing 
military aid to both Turkey and Greece. America’s institutional and struc-
tural presence in Greece and Turkey strengthened in the early 1950s with 
the accession of both countries to NATO and the Council of Europe and the 
signing of separate bilateral agreements regulating the status of US bases in 
both countries.
The objectives of both Greece and Turkey were fulfi lled with their partici-
pation in these organizations. Greece and Turkey could now institutionalize 
their relationship with other Western states. Through formal participation on 
the basis of legal equality in these multilateral organizations, both Greece 
and Turkey gradually developed legal, political, and psychological fi lters, 
muting direct intervention and maximizing perceptions of sovereignty and 
independence with predictable political benefi ts at home.
In this framework, Greek-Turkish relations were infl uenced quite posi-
tively. Bilateral relations became stabilized as identical Greek and Turk-
ish security concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union prompted them to establish 
closer ties with the West. The warming trend in Greek-Turkish relations was 
refl ected in the statement by Turkish President Celal Bayar during a state 
visit to Greece in January 1954, when he described Greek-Turkish coopera-
tion as “the best example of how the two countries who mistakenly mistrusted 
each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as 
a result of recognition of the realities of life.”8
As long as Greek and Turkish interests coincided, as they did for nearly 
7. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 453.
8. Ferenc Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 
228.
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a decade after the Second World War, there was no reason why their warm-
ing relationship could not have made further progress. This is what could 
reasonably have been expected in the early 1950s, given both countries’ fear 
of the Soviet Union and commitment to the Western alliance. However, when 
the vital interests of one seemed to be threatened by the other, as happened 
with the Cyprus issue in 1954 and 1955, the progress attained in Greek-
Turkish reconciliation and collaboration was lost.
The Outbreak of the Cyprus Confl ict and Deteriorating 
Relations between the Two NATO Allies
At the end of the 1940s, with decolonization pressures, the issue of Cyprus 
emerged as the major bone of contention dividing the Greeks, the British, 
and the Turks. Each of the three NATO countries felt that their vital inter-
ests were at stake, and they soon entered into a dangerous collision course. 
The task for the United States was to carve out policies that would lead to 
peaceful settlement that would not rupture the cohesiveness of the strategic 
southern fl ank of NATO. The decision of Greece to internationalize the issue 
in 1954, as well as the start of EOKA’s (National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters) violent struggle on Cyprus in 1955, led Britain to organize the Lon-
don Tripartite Conference with the participation of Greece and Turkey at the 
end of August 1955.9
As the conference commenced in London, on 6–7 September 1955 unruly 
Turkish citizen groups, with the backing of the Menderes government in 
Ankara (as proved later during his trial in 1961), attacked the property and 
persons of the Greek minority in Istanbul. The damage was considerable in 
blood and treasure.10
The Papagos government in Athens was incensed and ordered back to 
Greece all the Greek offi cers serving in a mixed NATO regional command 
9. The conference led nowhere, as Greece insisted that self-government should not exclude enosis 
(union of Cyprus and Greece) in the long run. Turkey preferred the continuation of British rule 
on Cyprus, but if any change was to come in the island’s status, Cyprus ought to revert to Turkey 
because of prior possession, geographic contiguity, and the presence of the 18 percent Turkish 
Cypriot minority. Thus the only compromise Turkey appeared to be willing to make was based on the 
policy of taksim, Greek-Turkish partition of Cyprus.
10. Alexandris. 
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operating in Izmir. The Greek side expected a strong offi cial US reaction. 
Instead, the American reaction was mild and did not satisfy the Greeks. The 
stance adopted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and announced in a 
letter of 18 September 1955—of keeping the United States at an equal dis-
tance from each country—disappointed and frustrated the Greeks. Secretary 
Dulles sent identical letters to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey 
deploring antagonism between the two countries and calling for restraint.11 
The message the United States was sending was to be repeated many times 
during the coming years: that the Cyprus problem, as well as bilateral prob-
lems between the countries, were relatively unimportant and had to be subor-
dinated to the real danger, which continued to be the communist infi ltration 
and exploitation of the weakness in the southeastern European region. As a 
result of the events of 1955, a considerable number of prosperous members 
of the Greek minority left Turkey for Greece.
American efforts on the Cyprus problem throughout the 1950s were 
designed to prevent Cyprus from disrupting the smooth functioning of the 
southeastern fl ank of NATO. The United States adopted a passive role toward 
Cyprus because it considered Cyprus within Britain’s sphere of infl uence. 
It was mainly concerned that the Cyprus crisis could cause a deterioration 
of relations among three of its allies and weaken NATO. It did not object to 
either enosis (union with Greece) or taksim (partition between Greece and 
Turkey), provided that these solutions would be the result of trilateral nego-
tiation. Hence, the United States opposed Greece’s recourse to the United 
Nations and called for negotiations among interested parties. Thus the even-
tual Zurich-London settlement of 1959 between Greece and Turkey and the 
declaration of the independence of Cyprus in 1960 were welcome develop-
ments for the United States. Washington was pleased with the compromise 
agreements, which seemed to eliminate a serious friction point in the rela-
tions of its three allies.
When intercommunal disputes broke out almost two years after the inde-
pendence of Cyprus, the United States decided to get involved in order to 
stop the civil strife in the island and the risk of a Greek-Turkish war. In June 
11. Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus (New 
York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1992), 25–30.
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1964 as the intercommunal violence was continuing, the Turkish government 
decided to intervene to protect its community and to strengthen its negotiat-
ing position to seek a better settlement.
Immediately, President Lyndon Johnson, in order to avoid a Turkish land-
ing in Cyprus, which would have resulted in a Greek-Turkish war, sent a 
letter to Premier Inönü. In that letter worded in a rather undiplomatic style, 
Johnson declared that the United States would cease to support Turkey if the 
Turkish intervention in Cyprus could lead to an involvement of the Soviet 
Union.12 As a result, a Turkish landing on Cyprus did not take place, but 
Turks were deeply hurt as they realized that the United States was not as 
reliable an ally as they had thought, and Turkey began to reconsider its rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
Having prevented a war between the two countries, the United States 
became convinced that the “independence” solution for Cyprus would not 
work and reached the conclusion that union with Greece would have been the 
best outcome. However, this was only to be achieved in return for Greece’s 
territorial concessions to Turkey, which the United States was determined not 
to humiliate.
American mediation efforts based on the above ideas were formulated in 
summer 1964 in Geneva under Dean Acheson. The Acheson plan for the 
Cyprus solution would have provided for a dissolution of the state of Cyprus 
on the basis of a Greek-Turkish agreement, offering the annexation option 
to Greece while allowing, in compensation, a smaller but sizable portion of 
Cyprus to be administered by mainland Turkey.13
All the versions of the American plan could have been sold to the Greeks 
as enosis and to the Turks as taksim. The plan in the American eyes would 
have solved the problem of Cyprus permanently and would have been to the 
alliance’s advantage. The island would have been retrieved from the status 
of a nonaligned state and placed within the NATO orbit, apportioned among 
the three NATO allies (as the British presence would have continued in its 
sovereign base areas in Cyprus.)
12. “Letters Exchanged between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu,” Middle East Jour-
nal (1966): 387.
13. Sotiris Rizas, Union, Division, Independence: United States and Britain Seeking a Solution, 
1963–1967 (in Greek) (Athens: Bivliorama, 2000), 127–9.
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In order for this solution to be achieved, Greece and Turkey would need 
to have agreed on the proposed terms (an apportionment of the territory of 
Cyprus) and would have to convince their respective communities on Cyprus 
of the benefi ts of the arrangement. On the fi rst issue Greece could not accept 
the idea of making territorial concessions, even if it was only for a military 
base for Turkey of the size of the British base. Turkey, on the other side, 
sought a larger portion of the island for its military base, to include space for 
as many Turkish Cypriot civilians as possible.
On the second issue, the Turkish government did not face problems as 
the Turkish Cypriot community fully approved of Turkish actions. However, 
the Greek government had to secure the cooperation of the hard-to-control 
Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, who was in favor of enosis but did 
not wish to give up his nonaligned policy for Cyprus.
Greek prime minister George Papandreou himself faced an enormous 
problem, as he could not control Makarios, and it was therefore diffi cult for 
him to commit Makarios to Greek policy and at the same time persuade 
the Americans to achieve the best possible agreement with the Turks. So he 
was trapped between the Makarios policy and his own vague populist policy 
toward enosis.
During the serious crisis of 1963–4, the US administration became 
involved actively and with some arrogance to contain the confl ict and to effect 
a new settlement in Cyprus between the two allies. But all its efforts came to 
no avail. The US handling of the Cyprus problem in 1964 was not successful 
for three reasons. First, the United States kept the problem within the NATO 
family, perceiving Greece and Turkey as being the countries that would be 
able to decide the fate of the island, and thus underestimated the power of 
the Cyprus government under Makarios, which refused to let those countries 
determine Cyprus’s future. Second, the United States fought the symptoms 
rather the roots of the problem, as Washington continued to see the Cyprus 
problem as a Greek-Turkish thorn in the southeastern fl ank of NATO. Third, 
the United States did not appreciate that both Greece and Turkey consid-
ered Cyprus more important in their foreign policy priorities than NATO 
solidarity.
Three years later, in November 1967, a new crisis burst on Cyprus. The 
Turkish government threatened to retaliate with military intervention unless 
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EOKA’s chief, George Grivas, was removed from the island together with 
the ten thousand Greek mainland troops that had been infi ltrated into 
Cyprus since 1964. American diplomacy became active again between Ath-
ens, Ankara, and Nicosia, and Cyrus Vance, as President Johnson’s special 
representative, convinced George Papadopoulos—one of the leaders of the 
Junta regime established in Athens in April 1967—to remove Grivas and the 
Greek army division from Cyprus, a development that satisfi ed Turkey.14
 Having experienced the unpleasant 1963–4 Geneva negotiations, in the 
1967 crisis the Americans tried only to manage the crisis, which was an easy 
task, as the Greek side accepted quickly the Turkish demands.
Once the split between Athens and Nicosia came to a head, with the 
coup d’état by the Greek colonels in Cyprus in summer 1974, US diplomacy 
became active again. Its aim was to keep Greece and Turkey from clash-
ing over Cyprus and harming the NATO fl ank. In 1974, the United States 
could not stop Turkey from intervening on the island, but as a general Greek-
Turkish war was avoided, the United States and particularly Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger did not really care about the eventual outcome of the 
crisis. However, if the United States had acted actively in 1974 as it did in 
the 1963–4 and 1967 crises, it may be that it could have been able to pre-
vent the outcome that still persists, although this is merely speculation in 
hindsight.
The Greek military regime orchestrated plans behind the scenes against 
Makarios in an effort to achieve enosis, the long-standing desire of Greece. 
The Junta was convinced that the United States would not allow Turkey to 
get involved in the island, but the coup against Makarios caused Turkish 
military intervention, as Turkey was determined in 1974 to protect its vital 
interests in the island.15
After the collapse of the Greek military regime in Athens, the new civilian 
government under Constantine Karamanlis could not really act effectively 
either diplomatically or militarily. At the diplomatic level, during the 1974 
14. Claude Nicolet, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954–1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish 
Bone of Contention (Mannheim und Mohnesee, Germany: Bibliopolis Mannheim und Mohnesee, 
2001), 361–3.
15. Suha Bölükbaşi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus 
(Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1988), 195.
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Geneva conference, decisions needed to be approved by Makarios who, at 
that time, chose for himself the role of the victim of both sides (Greek and 
Turkish) and who even in face of the military defeat could not accept a com-
promise.
In the military arena, Karamanlis did not undertake the high risk of 
declaring war against Turkey, being aware of the real capabilities of the 
Greek forces. And at that particular time it was impossible to trust the high 
military offi cials. So as a protest of US ineffectiveness to stop Turkey, he 
withdrew Greece from the military wing of NATO. 
Meanwhile, the strong Greek-American lobby in Congress began to put 
pressure on Turkey. In February 1975, Congress imposed an arms embargo 
on Turkey, on the grounds that American equipment had been misused in 
the Cyprus landing. The embargo stopped the delivery of arms already pur-
chased by Turkey and the disbursement of $200 million in grants. The action 
was vigorously opposed by the US administration, particularly by Secretary 
of State Kissinger, who argued that it would seriously weaken Turkey’s defen-
sive capability and thus damage the alliance.16 
Turkey’s reaction to the congressionally imposed US arms embargo came 
almost fi ve months later. On 26 July 1975, Turkey suspended US operations 
at all military installations within Turkey. Eventually, the US arms embargo 
was lifted, in 1978.17
The results of the 1974 crisis were crucial for both Greece and Turkey. 
Both states realized that their vital US ally was motivated by its strategic 
considerations without taking into account the vital interests of each country. 
The American role in the Cyprus confl ict during the decade from 1964 to 
1974 signifi cantly altered the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the role of 
the United States in Greek and Turkish national security. Both realized that 
NATO membership was not a panacea for all security contingencies. Both 
strove to decrease their dependency on the United States. Greece shifted its 
foreign policy to Western Europe, and Turkey improved its relations with the 
Soviet Union and other regional states.
16. Robert McDonald, “Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean—Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus: Part II Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean,” Adelphi Papers, no. 229 (1988): 61.
17. Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West since World War II,” in Turkey between East and West, 
ed. Vojtech Mastny and Craig Nation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 57–8.
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The Emergence of the Aegean Dispute and 
US Involvement after 1974
In the second half of the 1970s, the center of the Greek-Turkish confl ict 
shifted from Cyprus to the Aegean.18 In the light of its Cyprus experience, 
the Athens government was afraid that Ankara might be tempted to employ 
military force in this area. In order to avoid this, Greek diplomacy sought 
political and military assistance from the United States. The aim of the Greek 
strategy was both to get the United States to guarantee the territorial status 
quo in the Aegean and to allocate its military aid to Greece and Turkey in a 
manner that would not disrupt the regional balance of power.
As to US guarantees for the territorial status quo, Greek diplomatic efforts 
have not been particularly effective, although in 1976 the Karamanlis gov-
ernment obtained an offi cial commitment from US Secretary of State Kis-
singer “that the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either 
side seeking a military solution and will make major efforts to prevent such 
a course of action.”19 This was the closest the Greeks ever got to an offi cial 
guarantee for their borders with Turkey. In 1981, Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou20 went further by asking NATO to guarantee Greece’s eastern 
18. In late 1973, following the discovery of oil deposits off the southern shore of the island of Tha-
sos in the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea, a number of jurisdictional issues were added to the 
already emotionally heavy Greek-Turkish agenda. The Aegean dispute is a composite term covering 
three separate but related issues between Greece and Turkey: 
1. the dispute about sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf,
2. the question of the territorial sea limits claimed by each country, and
3. a dispute over military and civil air traffi c control zones in the Aegean area.
Three other questions are intimately involved and must be considered in connection with the Aegean 
dispute: the remilitarization of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean, the demilitarization of 
which was ordered by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947); the problem of minorities 
(the Greek orthodox minority of Istanbul and on the islands of Gockada, or Imvros, and Bozcada, or 
Tenedos); and the Muslim minority (mainly of Turkish origin) in Western Thrace. Greece recognizes 
as a problem only the delineation of the continental shelf and is in favor of a legal solution via the 
International Court of Justice, while Turkey prefers a political solution through bilateral negotiation. 
For details, see Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 
1990), 129–69; Christos Rozakis, “The International Legal Status of the Aegean and the Greek-
Turkish Crisis,” in Greek-Turkish Relations, 1923–1987 (in Greek), ed. Alexis Alexandris et al. 
(Athens: Gnosi, 1988), 269–492.
19. Dimitrios Bitsios, Beyond the Borders (in Greek) (Athens: Estia, 1983), 254.
20. In October 1981, PASOK, under Andreas Papandreou, came to power after having warned the 
Greek electorate in numerous speeches of the “Turkish threat.” The search for allies against “Turkish 
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borders.21 The Greek demand for border guarantees was repeated for some 
years but then shelved, as neither Washington nor NATO (let alone Turkey) 
was inclined to accept this kind of an arrangement.
Regarding the maintenance of the regional balance, the Greeks have been 
remarkably successful. Since 1978 it became an accepted practice for Con-
gress to allocate military aid to Greece and Turkey in the ratio of seven-
to-ten. In other words, Congress has given to the Greeks 70 percent of the 
military assistance it provides to the considerably larger Turkish armed 
forces, in spite of Turkish protests and the occasional unwillingness of the 
US executive branch.22
Turkey, too, tried to advance its position in the bilateral dispute via NATO. 
The Turkish side constantly blocked the Greek reentry to NATO until 1980 
and sought to internationalize the so-called Lemnos problem.23 Athens main-
tains that this strategically important island close to the Dardanelles may be 
militarized, thus stationing air force and army units on the island. Turkey 
quotes the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and argues that this island must be 
demilitarized. The Lemnos problem is a part of the overall Greek-Turkish 
dispute pertaining to the military status of the Greek islands of the east-
ern Aegean.24 Ankara has successfully internationalized and NATOized this 
bilateral problem by preventing—to the dislike of the Greeks—an inclusion 
of Lemnos in all NATO exercises.
expansionism” became the prime goal of Greek foreign policy. In December 1981—only a few 
weeks after his triumphant election victory—Papandreou attended a NATO defense ministers meet-
ing, where he stubbornly insisted on a guarantee by the alliance to shield Greece from aggression 
by Turkey. NATO members were not willing to agree to this demand, and the entire meeting ended 
in failure. For the fi rst time in NATO’s thirty-year history, no joint communiqué was issued. This 
was the most spectacular example of Papandreou’s internalization strategy in NATO. See Van Cou-
foudakis, “PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations” in Greece, 1981–1988: The Populist Decade, ed. 
Richard Clogg (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 172–3.
21. Richard Clogg, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period,” in The Greek-Turkish Con-
fl ict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Infl uences, ed. Dimitrios Konstas (London: Macmillan, 
1991), 18; Gürel, 92.
22. Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues,” CRS Issue Brief (1995), 
2.
23. Nikos Barbarousis, “The Militarization of Limnos,” Tetradia, no. 21 (in Greek) (1985): 79–87.
24. James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey: Problems, Policy Choices, and Medi-
terranean Security (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 13–4; Stavros Ligeros, “The NATO Dimension of the 
Greek-Turkish Dispute,” Tetradia, no. 25 (Greek) (1989): 53–62.
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The Greek-Turkish disputes over the limits of the continental shelf in 1976 
and 1987 caused serious tension in the Aegean and further worsened the 
relations between Greece and Turkey. During the 1976 crisis neither party 
attempted to involve the United States. After the end of the crisis, the Greek 
government launched two separate appeals, one in the Security Council and 
another to the International Court of Justice in an effort to internationalize 
the issue as much as possible and to involve as many international players as 
possible.25 The Turkish side asked for bilateral negotiations, a proposal that 
Greece rejected.
For the next six years, the Aegean continental shelf dispute remained a 
problem in Greek-Turkish relations; there was no real crisis, but no effort 
to solve the problem, either. Then in 1987, the issue of the shelf brought 
Turkey and Greece once again close to confl ict. This time Greece tried to 
mobilize NATO in an effort to resolve the crisis. Papandreou went further, by 
holding the United States responsible for the crisis. In an effort to pressure 
the United States, Papandreou ordered the suspension of operations of com-
munications facilities at the American base in Nea Makri and promptly dis-
patched his foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Sofi a to brief the Bulgar-
ian leader, Theodor Zivkof. In a calculated snub, the ambassadors of Warsaw 
Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO 
counterparts.26 Eventually, with the mediation efforts of the NATO secretary-
general, the tension subsided. 
The Aegean dispute has become the primary source of tension between 
the two allies. Each side has developed and structured its arguments over the 
Aegean issues with no real intention or will to move even slightly toward a 
peaceful solution. The United States has followed a hands-off policy intended 
to project the alliance impartiality and has encouraged both nations to settle 
their disputes bilaterally. It attempted neither to take a more active role as a 
mediator nor to take public positions on the bilateral dispute.
25. The Greek foreign minister asked the American ambassador in Greece, Jack Kubish, that the 
United States play “fair” and not act behind the scenes in favor of Turkey during the discussions at 
the Security Council. Bitsios, 82.
26. Clogg, “Greek-Turkish Relations,” 12–26; “Aegean and Turkish Provocativeness,” Ptisi (May–
June 1987): 4.
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New Phase: Greek-Turkish Disputes in the post–Cold War Era
The end of the Cold War brought about signifi cant changes and new chal-
lenges in the foreign policy priorities for Greece, Turkey, and the United 
States. The bilateral problems between the two allies as well as the Cyprus 
issue remained intact, and relations further deteriorated during the last 
decade of the twentieth century.
US policy toward the dispute did not change substantially after the end 
of the Cold War. The United States has continued to seek to preserve stabil-
ity in the eastern Mediterranean, a region bordered with confl ict zones, and 
to prevent NATO from being embroiled in local controversies. In order to 
achieve these goals, the United States tried to remain “neutral” and worked 
to resolve disputes between the two NATO members. Compared to the period 
between 1974 and 1989, the United States has since the end of the Cold 
War been more active. The eruption of the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1995 was 
stopped only by American intervention, and the threatened deployment of the 
Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus did not take place after intensive Ameri-
can mediation. A new important parameter in this triangular relationship in 
the 1990s was the European Union, whose policies were welcomed from the 
American side. All the countries involved in the dispute have political links 
with the EU. Greece has been a member for some years, Cyprus became a 
full member in May 2004, and Turkey is a candidate member. A search for 
a solution of the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute through EU diplo-
matic channels and ideas is under discussion and consideration.
The Imia/Kardak crisis was the fi rst “hot” incident in the Aegean in the 
post–Cold War era. A small Turkish cargo ship went aground in late Decem-
ber 1995 less than four miles off the Turkish coast on an uninhabited rocky 
islet group, called Imia by the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks. The Turkish 
captain refused to have his vessel rescued by Greek authorities, claiming 
that he was in Turkish territorial waters.27 The two foreign ministries thereaf-
ter exchanged information, holding to differing positions on the islets sover-
eignty but refraining from making confrontational demands or going public.
One month later this event created more publicity as the local Greek mayor 
raised the Greek fl ag over the islet. Turkish news reporters took to the scene 
27. Fuat Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations from Confl ict to Détente: The Last Decade,” Turkish 
Review of Balkan Studies, no. 6 (2001): 172.
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from a helicopter and hoisted a Turkish fl ag in place of the Greek one. Media 
in each country exaggerated the issue. Both governments dispatched war-
ships, and the Turks landed a detachment of marines on one of the islets.28
Washington moved to defuse the crisis. President Bill Clinton placed calls 
for a peaceful outcome, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke began intense 
mediation. American diplomatic efforts were targeted to bring the situation 
back to its former status and succeeded.29 The US position was that “in case 
of not opening fi re against the Turkish soldiers and if the Greek military force 
withdraws its presence and the Greek fl ag, the Turkish military forces will do 
the same.” The statement from the United States emphasized that: “the party 
that shoots the fi rst bullet will fi nd the United States against it.”30 Finally 
both sides withdrew, and a return to the status quo ante was achieved.31
The issue arose just after the accidental grounding of the Turkish ship. 
Until then there were no doubts about the sovereignty of these islets, which 
according to a Turkish-Italian document of 1932 specifi cally listed these 
islets as belonging at the time to the Italians, which means sovereignty would 
have been transferred from Italy to Greece after World War II under the 
terms of the 1947 Paris Treaty.32
28. Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues—Background and Recent Develop-
ments,” CRS Issue Brief (1997): 4; Alkis Kourkoulas, Imia: A Critical Approach of Turkish Policy 
(in Greek) (Athens: Sideris, 1997).
29. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations,” 175; Krateros Ioannou, “A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Inci-
dent between Greece and Turkey,” Thesis 1, no. 1 (1997): 1–7.
30. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations,” 174; James Wilkinson, “The United States, Turkey and 
Greece—Three’s a Crowd,” in Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, ed. Morton Abramo-
vitz (New York: Century Foundation, 2000), 185–218.
31. During the crisis, Kostas Simitis became the Greek prime minister after the resignation of the 
ill Andreas Papandreou. Simitis at that time did not have full control of the government, and to a 
certain degree there was lack of coordination. On the other hand, in Turkey Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller ruled a coalition government and was in the middle of an effort to form a new government after 
the elections of December 1995. The crisis might have taken place even if both states had more 
stable governments, but domestic instability may have been a part of the escalation of the crisis. 
See “Nea Sinora Zitoun sto Agaio: Apeili Thermou Episodiou” (They demand new borders in the 
Aegean: Threat of a new hot incident), Ta Nea, 30 January 1996, 10; “Telos Tholo: Hmiselinos sto 
Nisaki mas” (Unclear end: The crescent in our small island), Elepherotipia, 31 January 1996, 7–9; 
“To Sxedio tou Polemou” (The plan of the war), Eleftherotypia, 4 February 1996, 7; “Ti Kanoume 
an xana Ktipisei i Tourkia” (What do we do if Turkey attacks?), Ta Nea, 1 February 1996, 10. Also 
see Turkish Daily News, 31 January 1996, 4, and 2 February 996, 6–8. 
32. The Turkish government, however, asserted that this Italian-Turkish protocol had never entered 
into force and that the rocks themselves had been “registered” by the onshore Turkish province of 
Mugla. See Yuksek Inan and Sertac Başeren, Status of Kardak Rocks (in Turkish), unpublished 
Turkish government report, Ankara, 1997.
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In the period that followed, the Turkish government refused to concede 
on this issue but also insisted that there are “gray zones” in the Aegean and 
numerous small islets or rocks whose sovereignty is unclear despite Greek 
claims.33 Ankara did not provide specifi cs, but neither did it abandon the 
position, which garnered broad public credence in Turkey.34 This angered 
Greek public opinion enormously. The Turkish government was seen to 
have embarked on a new and more aggressive course, threatening to redraw 
boundaries throughout the Aegean at Greece’s expense.35
This Greek-Turkish crisis showed that when a situation is escalated, 
the Greek and Turkish governments have been unable or unwilling to deal 
directly with each other, and the mission has fallen to the Americans. During 
the crisis, both sides followed an adamant position and were determined not 
to lose face, even if the consequence could have been war. When the worst 
was avoided, both decided in favor of a peaceful resolution, recognizing that 
a war was not in either side’s national interest.
A similar situation took place after the decision of the Cyprus government 
in January 1997 to contract with Russia for the purchase of S-300 missiles, 
an antiaircraft system similar to the American Patriot missile.36 The Turks 
reacted strongly. They denounced the missile purchase as unwarranted esca-
lation, denied there was any threat from Turkish planes, and described the 
33. See Melek Firat, “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era,” in Neighbors of Turkey (in 
Turkish), ed. Mustafa Türkȩs and Ilber Uzgel (Ankara: Imge, 2002), 56–9.
34. “Me Polemo mas Fovizei i Tourkia” (Turkey threatens us with war), Elepherotipia, 5 February 
1996, 2.
35. “Neo Thema Vazi i Tourkia” (Turkey raises new issue), Elepherotipia, 6 February 1996, 2.
36. The purchase of the missiles was part of the implementation of a military modernization program 
designed to produce quantitative and qualitative improvements in the country’s defense capabilities 
vis-à-vis Turkey, seen as the single major external threat. In addition to a deterrence strategy, based 
on a military cooperation agreement and common defense doctrine instituted with Greece in 1993, 
Greek Cypriots opened an air base at Paphos and completed a $425-million purchase agreement for 
thirty Russian S-300 medium-range, surface-to-air missiles. According to the Greek Cypriots, this 
military strategy would reinforce their position in the intercommunal talks and put some pressure 
on the international community to achieve the withdrawal or even a serious reduction of the Turkish 
troops. It would also guarantee the security of the Greek-Cypriot population, as they lived under the 
shadow of a permanent menace. See “S-300: To Thriller Sinexizetai” (S-300: Thriller carries on), 
To Vima, 29 November 1998, A32; “S-300: To Xroniko mias Proanagelthisas Egatastasis” (S-300: 
The events for a preannounced deployment), To Vima, 29 March 29 1998, A24; “Tous S-300 Tous 
Xehasate?” (Did you forget the S-300?), To Vima, 15 November 1998, A30; “S-300: O Telikos 
Giros” (S-300: The fi nal round), Eletherotipia, 8 November 1998, 17; Turkish Probe, November 6 
1998, 4; Turkish Probe, 8 December 1998, 3–4.
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S-300 missiles as jeopardizing not only Turkish Cypriots but the security of 
Turkey itself.37 Ankara said it would “not tolerate” deployment, and the gen-
eral staff was directed to take “additional military measures.” Washington 
decried both the deployment and the threat of military action in response.38
Cyprus President Glafkos Clerides postponed implementation twice in 
1998 and in December of that year announced a decision, which had been 
taken in consultation with Athens, to cancel the deployment. The missiles 
were instead to be sent to Crete. The Clerides government, which backed 
down despite strong domestic support, received intense pressure from the 
United States and the Europeans and was concerned about possible adverse 
effects on Cyprus’s pending application for EU membership. Although state-
ments from Athens were carefully phrased to maintain the credibility of the 
“joint defense doctrine,” the Greek government did not oppose deployment, 
presumably because it did not desire the escalation of a new Greek-Turkish 
crisis, which could have been caused by Turkish military actions.39
Conclusion
During the post–Cold War era the United States was successful in its cri-
sis management role, which preserved the stability of NATO in southeastern 
Europe and avoided the unthinkable: the two allies going to war. On the 
other hand, US efforts to mediate for a solution proved fruitless. Washington 
has put itself forth as the premier honest broker, has used special envoys as 
its primary weapons, and has focused principally on kick-off negotiations, 
though its activism has not yet achieved its stated goal. The relative ineffec-
tiveness of the world’s only superpower in this specifi c peacekeeping enter-
prise stems to a large extent from US political considerations. This is always 
a disadvantage in the US mediating efforts.
37. Henze Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European Security,” Survival 39, no. 3 (1997): 19; 
Hasan Ünal, “Missiles off to Crete, Is Peace Any Nearer?” Strategist (February–March 1999): 
35–7; Gulden Ayman, “A Case of Brinkmanship: S-300 Missile Crisis,” Turkish Review of Balkan 
Studies, no. 7 (2002): 5–34.
38. Washington had additional concerns. The possible deployment of Russian weapons on the 
already overly militarized island was an undesirable development for the American side. See Nicho-
las Berns, interview, at www.ana.gr/hermes/1998/sep/interview/htm, accessed 30 November 2003.
39. Eletherotipia, 6 September 1998.
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On the other side, both Greece and Turkey have perceptions of a US role 
that are completely different. The Greeks ask from the Americans support 
and understanding for their problems; the Turks, on the other hand, think 
that they can deal with the Greeks by themselves. The common perception 
for Greece and Turkey is that both think that the United States is in favor of 
the other.
Additionally, the United States has to a certain degree put pressure on 
the two parties but there are clear and defi nite limits. The whole history of 
the disputes and the American role have shown that whatever the Americans 
propose, it is the two governments that should have the political courage and 
will to decide and commit. The search for a more effective US role in Greek-
Turkish disputes will continue for American decision makers. At least keep-
ing and strengthening Greek-Turkish détente is a positive element. Further-
more, the involvement of the EU may provide an opportunity for the United 
States to disengage itself to a certain extent from bilateral Greek-Turkish 
disputes.
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